CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1237
21 January 1994

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

I have the honour to submit to you a document containing the statement by President Soeharto, in his capacity as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, on the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula.

It would be highly appreciated, if you could take the necessary steps to include this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and at the same time to make it available to all member and non-member States, participating in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Soemadi D.M. Brotodiningrat

GE.94-60131 (E)

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM)
ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE
ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

As is already known, at the Tenth summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Heads of State/Government of the member-countries of the NAM noted and declared their support for the positive developments on the Korean Peninsula with regard to the objective of the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas as well as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as reflected in the agreement reached at the high level meeting between the two Koreas in February 1992. Also in this context, President Soeharto as Chairman of the NAM, after having carefully followed the current developments on the Korean Peninsula especially in relation to the nuclear issue which has subsequently emerged, has asked the Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs to give instructions to the Indonesian Permanent Representative to the United Nations to hold consultation with the NAM Coordinating Bureau as well as with the Member-Countries of the NAM caucus in the UN Security Council, with a view to considering the best steps to take in order to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Nuclear issue involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). This issue has evidently drawn the attention of the international community as manifested by its being taken up in recent Security Council and General Assembly sessions.

In recent days the NAM Chairman has observed with concern the developments on this nuclear issue, especially after the postponement of the third round of negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, direct talks between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, and the talks between DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). There is growing concern that, inter alia, the statements issued by the parties directly involved may lead towards the worsening of the situation which will ultimately affect the stability and security of the region in particular and of the ASEAN continent in general. On the other hand, President Soeharto fully realizes that the problem appears to be complex, difficult, and at the same time sensitive. It is in this regard that President Soeharto as Chairman of the NAM has asked the Head Executive Assistant to the NAM Chairman to continuously monitor the developments on this issue particularly by collecting as many factual information and data as possible which the NAM Chairman needs in weighing the steps that he may in due time take in order to alleviate tensions and help create a condition conducive to a settlement through negotiations. For that

purpose, the NAM Chairman sent the Head Executive Assistant to the NAM Chairman as his special envoy to meet with President Kim Il Sung and other high-ranking officials of the DPRK, on a visit which took place on December 18 - 21, 1993.

As Chairman of the NAM, Indonesia has always been informed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a member of the NAM on the developments on the problem and has always had DPRK's assurances that it would seek a solution to the issue through negotiations. Indonesia welcomes the willingness of all the parties, expressed on various occasions, to solve the problem through negotiations. Indonesia, in its capacity as chairman of the NAM, therefore calls for the continuation of negotiations through the existing and ongoing dialogue forums such as the dialogue forums of DPRK-US, DPRK-ROK, and DPRK-IAEA, as well as other diplomatic efforts, so as to reach an agreement acceptable to all parties involved. While these efforts are in progress, Indonesia, as Chairman of the NAM, also appeals to all parties to work seriously for the creation of the conducive atmosphere needed for the expeditions conduct of these negotiations.

Indonesia believes that the solution of this problem could engender the growth of economic relations and cooperation that are mutually beneficial, while at the same time promoting peace, security and prosperity which have always been the aspiration of the NAM in particular and of the international community in General.

Jakarta, 5 January 1994

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1237/Corr.1
1 March 1994

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Corrigendum

Page 2, paragraph 2, line 8

For ASEAN read Asian

GE.94-60500

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1238
25 January 1994

Original: ENGLISH

Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee
under Agenda Item 1

"Nuclear Test Ban"

(Adopted at the 666th plenary meeting on 25 January 1994)

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban", and to give priority to its work.

The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security.

Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, as well as the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee to establish the necessary working groups in order to carry forward effectively this negotiating mandate; these should include at least two working groups, one on verification and one on legal and institutional issues, which should be established in the initial stage of the negotiation, and any others which the Committee may subsequently decide upon.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1994 session.

GE.94-60155 (E)

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1239
25 January 1994

Original: ENGLISH

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE AGENDA AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK FOR THE 1994 SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT at the 666th plenary meeting on 25 January 1994

1. There is an understanding in the Conference that, at the outset of its 1994 session, the Conference decides, pending the conclusion of its consultations on the review of this agenda and without prejudice to their outcome, to adopt as its agenda the agenda of its 1993 session:

1. Nuclear test ban.

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

8. Transparency in armaments.

9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

2. The Conference further agrees, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to begin its work immediately on: "Nuclear test ban", "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and "Transparency in armaments". For this purpose, the Conference establishes Ad Hoc Committees on these items with the following mandates:

- Nuclear test ban (document CD/1238);

- Prevention of an arms race in outer space (document CD/1125);

- Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (document CD/1121);

- Transparency in armaments: (document CD/1150).

3. The Conference also decides, in the framework of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", to appoint, as a first step, a Special Coordinator to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It further requests the Special Coordinator to report on the progress of his consultations before the end of the first part of the session.

4. The Conference also recalls its decision to itensify its consultations on its improved and effective functioning, including its decision to carry out consultations on the issues of its membership and agenda. For this purpose, I confirm that I shall appoint two Special Coordinators to conduct consultations on the issues of membership and agenda respectively.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1240
27 January 1994

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE CONCLUDING STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER AT THE SPECIAL (INFORMAL) MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES HELD IN NEW YORK ON 10 AUGUST 1993

I have the honour to submit to you a document containing the concluding statement of the President of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water at the Special (Informal) Meeting of the States Parties, New York, 10 August 1993.

It would be highly appreciated, if you could take the necessary steps to include this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and at the same time to make it available to all member and non-member States, participating in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Soemadi D.M. Brotodiningrat

GE.94-60173

CONCLUDING STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER AT THE SPECIAL (INFORMAL) MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES NEW YORK, 10 AUGUST 1993

1. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 47/46, a Special Meeting of the States Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was held on 10 August 1993. There was a general exchange of views on the developments regarding the issue of nuclear testing and the Parties considered the feasibility of resuming the work of the Amendment Conference.

2. The Special Meeting welcomed the encouraging developments concerning nuclear testing, in particular the de facto moratoria of nuclear tests declared by some nuclear states and their commitment to work expeditiously towards achieving a comprehensive test ban.

3. The Special Meeting further welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test ban.

4. The urgency for achieving a comprehensive test ban as well as the need for an expeditious means to realize this objective was emphasized by the Special Meeting.

5. The Special Meeting directed its attention to the fact that the consideration on a comprehensive test ban has been underway on three tracks, namely in the Conference on Disarmament, in the Amendment Conference and in the consultations among the nuclear powers. While some delegations expressed their own preference as to the forum in which a comprehensive test ban should be pursued, there was a general consensus that the work on a comprehensive test ban in the different forums, and especially between the Amendment

Conference and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) should be mutually supportive and mutually complementary.

6. There was also a broad consensus among the States Parties that the President of the Amendment Conference should continue his consultations with the States Parties as well as States not parties to the PTBT and to hold another Special Meeting early in 1994 in order to review developments and assess the situation regarding a comprehensive nuclear test ban and to examine the feasibility of resuming the work of the Amendment Conference later that year. In this connection it was recalled that pursuant to the decision of the Amendment Conference, further work needed to be undertaken especially that with regard to verification of compliance and possible sanctions against non-compliance.

7. In order to promote universality of a comprehensive test ban, the Special Meeting considered it essential that in pursuing his efforts, the President of the Amendment Conference closely liaise with the Conference on Disarmament and with the five nuclear powers.

8. The Special Meeting agreed that the elements of consensus emerging from this meeting could be used as the basis for formulating a draft resolution on the Amendment Conference in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1241
2 February 1994

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING FOUR COMPENDIA OF DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO SUPPORT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY 1/

I have the honour to transmit to you four compendia of CD documents to support the negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT):

- the first volume covers Plenary Statements (PV) on a CTBT for 1990-1993;

- the second, Plenary Working Papers (WP) for 1990-1993;

- the third, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban Working Papers (CD/NTB/WP) for 1982 to 1993; and

- the fourth, treaty and draft treaty texts relating to a Nuclear Test Ban, from 1962 to 1993.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for the distribution of the above four volumes to all member and participating non-member State delegations, under cover of a CD number.

(Signed): Paul Dubois
Minister and Deputy
Permanent Representative to
the Conference on Disarmament

1/ A limited distribution of this publication in English only has been made available to the members and non-members invited to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Permanent Mission of Canada.

GE.94-60222 (E)

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1242
4 February 1994

Original: ENGLISH and RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING TEXTS OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS ISSUED IN MOSCOW ON 14 JANUARY 1994

We have the honour to forward to you the English and Russian language texts of the Moscow Declaration, the Joint Statement by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of their Delivery, the Joint Statement on Issues of Export Control and Policy in the Area of Transfers of Conventional Weapons and Dual-Use Technologies, and the Memorandum of Intent on Cooperation in the Area of Export Control, issued in Moscow on 14 January 1994.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to register these documents as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have them distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador and United States
Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Grigori V. Berdennikov
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of
the Russian Federation
to the Conference on
Disarmament

GE.94-60249 (E)

Moscow Declaration

President of the United States William J. Clinton and President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin, having met together in Moscow from January 12-15, 1994, reaffirmed the fundamental importance of U.S.-Russian cooperation based upon the Charter of American-Russian Partnership and Friendship, the Vancouver Declaration, and existing treaties and agreements. They noted with satisfaction that the relationship between the United States and Russia has entered a new stage of mature strategic partnership based on equality, mutual advantage, and recognition of each other's national interests. From this perspective, they reviewed the full range of bilateral and international issues.

The two Presidents had an extensive discussion of security issues, including arms reduction and non-proliferation. Both parties expressed concern over increasing challenges to global non-proliferation regimes. They agreed upon the need to strengthen those regimes and to create, together with other interested states, a new mechanism to enhance transparency and responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use technologies. They also strongly supported completion of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible time. The two Presidents reiterated their support for a cutoff of production of fissile materials for weapons and considered new measures to strengthen strategic stability.

Based on ongoing discussions of strategic disengagement measures between the ministries of defense of the two countries,

the Presidents announced that they would direct the detargeting of strategic nuclear missiles under their respective commands so that by not later than May 30, 1994, those missiles will not be targeted. Thus, for the first time in nearly half a century -- virtually since the dawn of the nuclear age -- the United States and Russia will not operate nuclear forces, day-to-day, in a manner that presumes they are adversaries.

President Clinton and President Yeltsin expressed satisfaction with the accelerating development of a wide range of economic, scientific and technological relationships between the United States and Russia. They also reaffirmed their strong support for the rapid growth of bilateral trade and investment as a special priority. In their view, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has become a dynamic and effective mechanism for coordination and expansion of U.S.-Russian cooperation. A key expression of this relationship is U.S.-Russian joint cooperation in space, especially their partnership, with other interested parties, in the construction of a space station.

The two Presidents reaffirmed their readiness to move forward on the path of openness and mutual trust in American-Russian relations and to create favorable conditions for the comprehensive development of political, commercial, humanitarian, and people-to-people contacts between the two countries. In this connection, a mutual interest in enlarging the consular presence on each other's territory was expressed. In particular, the American side intends to open a consulate general in

Yekaterinburg in February 1994.

With the approval by the U.S. Congress of NAFTA and the successful completion of the Uruguay Round of global trade negotiations, President Clinton and President Yeltsin welcomed the accelerating progress toward creation of an open and prosperous world economy and trading system. President Yeltsin informed President Clinton of recent steps among the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States toward increased economic coordination and cooperation. The two Presidents agreed that such initiatives, pursued in an open and voluntary manner consistent with GATT rules and procedures, should be conducive to the rapid inclusion of all the participating states into the global economy.

In this context, President Clinton and President Yeltsin exchanged views on the economic strategies of their respective governments. President Yeltsin described the economic situation in Russia. He affirmed the irreversibility of Russia's transition to a market economy and his intention to further promote reforms and to address social needs associated with this transition. President Clinton stressed his strong support for Russian reform and suggested that social issues could be a new and promising area for cooperation.

President Clinton and President Yeltsin noted with satisfaction that the end of the Cold War has brought continuous progress toward overcoming the division of the European continent and opened the way for broad cooperation among European states on

a new agenda of urgent tasks, with priority being given to preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and protection of human rights and the rights of national and other minorities. In this connection, the two Presidents welcomed the decisions of the CSCE Foreign Ministers' meeting in Rome which they consider to be an important step in making the CSCE a key mechanism of international cooperation in Europe.

Proceeding from the conviction that new divisions of Europe must be avoided, President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed upon the need to create a new European security order that is inclusive, non-discriminatory and focused on practical political and security cooperation. The two Presidents agreed that the concept of the Partnership for Peace adopted at the Brussels meeting of the NATO member states is an important element of an emerging new European security architecture. President Yeltsin informed President Clinton of Russia's intention to participate actively in the Partnership for Peace and to conclude substantive agreements opening the way for broad and intensive cooperation between Russia and NATO as a partner. Taking into account Russia's international role, President Clinton welcomed the prospect of Russia's active participation in the Partnership for Peace.

The two Presidents condemned aggressive nationalism, violations of human rights, and ethnic and religious intolerance of any kind, including anti-Semitism. They expressed serious concern about the existence and potential for intensification of

conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and a number of the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. President Yeltsin apprised President Clinton of the peacekeeping efforts undertaken by Russia on the territory of the former USSR. The two Presidents are determined to intensify the coordination of their efforts, within the framework of the United Nations and the CSCE, to promote rapid and peaceful resolution of conflicts on conditions that correspond to generally accepted standards of international law, including respect for the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of the new independent states of the former Soviet Union.

The two Presidents reaffirmed the support of the United States and Russia for the United Nations. They will act with other countries to strengthen the potential of the UN to support and establish peace and to prevent conflict. The two sides will work out practical activities among themselves and other countries to improve preparations for participation in UN peacekeeping operations. In connection with the upcoming 50th anniversary of the UN, President Clinton and President Yeltsin consider it important to convene at the appropriate time a meeting of the heads of states and government of the members of the UN Security Council for a review of the work established for the UN at the January 1992 Security Council summit and an examination of tasks for the future.

President Clinton and President Yeltsin are convinced that the United States and Russia will continue to consolidate their

partnership and together promote global stability, peace, and prosperity.

Done in Moscow on January 14, 1994, in the English and Russian languages.

For the United States of America:

For the Russian Federation:

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE MEANS OF THEIR DELIVERY

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, during their meeting in Moscow on January 14, 1994, agreed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems represents an acute threat to international security in the period following the end of the Cold War. They declared the resolve of their countries to cooperate actively and closely with each other, and also with other interested states, for the purpose of preventing and reducing this threat.

The Presidents noted that the proliferation of nuclear weapons creates a serious threat to the security of all states, and expressed their intention to take energetic measures aimed at prevention of such proliferation.

- Considering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the basis for efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, they called for its indefinite and unconditional extension at a conference of its participants in 1995, and they urged that all states that have not done so accede to this treaty.

- They expressed their resolve to implement effective measures to limit and reduce nuclear weapons. In this connection, they advocated the most rapid possible entry into force of the START I and START II treaties.

- They agreed to review jointly appropriate ways to strengthen security assurances for the states which have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and that comply strictly with their non-proliferation obligations.

- They expressed their support for the International Atomic Energy Agency in its efforts to carry out its safeguards responsibilities. They also expressed their intention to provide assistance to the Agency in the safeguards field, including through joint efforts of their relevant laboratories to improve safeguards.

- They supported the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and agreed with the need for effective implementation of the principle of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports, and with the need for export controls on dual-use materials and technology in the nuclear field.

- They reaffirmed their countries' commitment to the conclusion as soon as possible of an international treaty to achieve a comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions and welcomed the decision to begin negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. They declared their firm intention to provide political support for the negotiating process, and appealed to other states to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are being held.

- They noted that an important contribution to the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be made by a verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and by the most rapid conclusion of an international convention to this effect with the widest possible participation of states and on a non-discriminatory basis.

- They agreed to cooperate with each other and also with other states to elaborate measures designed to prevent the accumulation of excess stocks of fissile materials and over time to reduce such stocks.

- They agreed to establish a joint working group to consider:

  -- including in their voluntary IAEA safeguards offers all source and special fissionable materials, excluding only those associated with activities having direct national security significance;

  -- steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of putting a portion of fissile material under IAEA safeguards. Particular attention would be given to materials released in the process of nuclear disarmament and steps to ensure that these materials would not be used again for nuclear weapons.

- The presidents also tasked their experts to study options for the long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly of plutonium, taking into account the issues of non-proliferation, environmental protection, safety, and technical and economic factors.

- They reaffirmed the intention of interested organizations of the two countries to complete within a short time a joint study of the possibilities of terminating the production of weapon-grade plutonium.

- The Presidents agreed that reduction of the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear materials is a high priority, and in this context they noted the usefulness of the September 1993 Agreement to cooperate in improving the system of controls, accounting, and physical protection for nuclear materials. They attached great significance to further joint work on the separate but closely related problems of accounting for nuclear materials used in the civilian and military fields.

Both presidents favored a further increase in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

- As the heads of the countries that have the world's largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, they acknowledged particular responsibility for eliminating the threat posed by these weapons. In this context, they declare their resolute support for the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and their intention to promote ratification as rapidly as possible and entry into force of the Convention not later than 1995.

- To promote implementation of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, they welcomed the conclusion of the implementing documents for the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and agreed to conclude work in as short a time as possible on the implementing documents for the Bilateral Agreement on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons.

- The Presidents reaffirmed their desire to facilitate the safe, secure, timely, and ecologically sound destruction of chemical weapons in the United States and the Russian Federation. They applauded the joint Chemical Weapons Destruction Work Plan recently concluded between the two countries which leads the way for the United States to provide additional $30 million to support an analytical chemical laboratory in Russia to facilitate chemical weapons destruction. The United States also agreed to consider appropriate additional measures to support Russia's chemical weapons destruction program.

- They reiterated the importance of strict compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons and of continued implementation of measures in accordance with the Russian-American-British Statement of September 1992, which provides _inter alia_ for the reciprocal visits of facilities and meetings between experts in order to ensure confidence

in the compliance with the Convention.

- They supported convening a special conference of the states parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons in order to consider measures that would contribute to transparency and thereby confidence in compliance with the Convention and its effectiveness.

The presidents expressed the determination of their countries to cooperate with each other in preventing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

- They welcomed the conclusion of the Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Export of Missile Equipment and Technologies, signed in September 1993, noted the importance of this Agreement for ensuring mutually beneficial cooperation between the United States and Russia in the field of space exploration, and agreed to collaborate closely in order to ensure its full and timely implementation.

- The United States welcomed Russia's intention to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and undertook to cooperate with Russia in facilitating its membership at an early date. The United States of America and the Russian Federation are certain that further strengthening the MTCR, including the prudent expansion of membership, will help reduce the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technologies in the regional context as well.

The presidents of the two countries agreed that, in addition to strengthening global norms of non-proliferation and working out agreements to this effect, close cooperation is essential in order to develop policies on non-proliferation applicable to specific regions posing the greatest risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

- They agreed that nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would represent a grave threat to regional and international security, and decided that their countries would consult with each other on ways to eliminate this danger. They called upon the DPRK to honor fully its obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in connection with the Treaty, and to resolve the problems of safeguards implementation, inter alia, through dialogue between

IAEA and DPRK. They also urged full and speedy implementation of the Joint Declaration of the ROK and the DPRK on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

- They supported efforts to reach agreement on the establishment of a multilateral forum to consider measures in the field of arms control and non-proliferation that could strengthen security in South Asia. They called on India and Pakistan to join in the negotiation of and become original signatories to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Test Explosion and the proposed Convention to Ban Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each other's territories.

- They agreed that the United States and Russia, as co-chairs in the Middle East peace process, would actively promote progress in the activity of the working group for Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East, striving for speedy development of confidence-building measures and working toward the objective of turning the Middle East into a region free of weapons of mass destruction, where conventional forces would not exceed reasonable defense needs.

- They firmly supported the efforts of the UN Special Commission and the IAEA to put into operation a long-term monitoring system of the military potential of Iraq, and called upon Iraq to comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.

JOINT STATEMENT ON ISSUES OF EXPORT CONTROLS AND POLICY IN THE AREA OF TRANSFERS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES

The Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation underscored the staunch commitment of their countries to efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to enhance global and regional stability. In keeping with the spirit of the new strategic partnership between the United States and Russia the Ministers have agreed on development of wide-ranging cooperation in the field of export control. Moreover, they have agreed that all necessary steps in this field be taken expeditiously, and have established a senior-level working group for this purpose, as well as to initiate bilateral cooperation in the areas specified in a Memorandum of Intent signed this day in Moscow.

The Ministers expressed satisfaction with steps taken since the last meeting of the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation to eliminate the vestiges of the Cold War, such as the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which according to the understanding reached by COCOM members will be terminated not later than March 31, 1994. They also welcomed the decision to establish a new multilateral regime for enhancing responsibility and transparency in the transfers of armaments and sensitive dual-use technologies. This new arrangement would not be directed against any state or group of states, and would prevent the acquisition of such items for military end uses if the behavior of a state is or becomes a cause for serious concern as determined by the participants of the new multilateral regime.

The United States and Russia, as leading exporters of conventional weapons, military equipment and dual-use technologies, are convinced that additional measures are needed on an international basis to increase responsibility, transparency and, where appropriate, restraint in this area. They expressed their willingness to work with other countries in bringing about the early establishment of a new multilateral regime in order to achieve these objectives, which would supplement existing non-proliferation regimes, in particular through arrangements to exchange information for the purpose of meaningful consultations.

MEMORANDUM OF INTENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF EXPORT CONTROL

The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America,

REAFFIRMING their desire to promote the strengthening of measures directed against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and other weapons, as well as the technologies and specialized experience relating to such weapons;

DESIRING to develop cooperation of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in the area of export controls;

NOTING that cooperation in strengthening the export control systems in the Russian Federation and the United States of America will promote the development of economic, scientific, and technological relationships between the two countries in accordance with principles of equality and mutual benefit;

INTEND TO COOPERATE IN ANY OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

a. Conducting bilateral and multilateral discussions at the political and technical level on matters relating to the enhancement of export control systems;

b. Conducting bilateral consultations at the expert and government levels on obligations relating to non-use of export controlled items for unapproved purposes;

c. Conducting bilateral consultations on specific multilateral export control regimes and their implementation and on the technical parameters of the items and technologies covered by them;

d. Participating in seminars, conferences, and other multilateral meetings devoted to considering export control issues;

e. Discussing opportunities to train personnel involved with export control, the work of licensing and customs agencies; and

f. Joint efforts to expand cooperation in the area of export control.

The Parties may establish expert working groups for the purposes of carrying out this Memorandum of Intent.

DONE at Moscow, this 14th day of January, 1994, in two copies, each in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Warren Christopher

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1243
4 February 1994

Original: ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING TEXTS OF THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND UKRAINE, AS WELL AS THE ANNEX TO THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT, SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON 14 JANUARY 1994

We have the honour to forward to you the English and Russian language texts of the Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America, as well as the Annex to the Trilateral Statement. The documents were signed in Moscow on 14 January 1994.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to register these documents as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have them distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) Grigori V. Berdennikov
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on
Disarmament

(Signed) Olexandre Slipchenko
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Ukraine
Head of Delegation

(Signed) Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador and United States
Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

GE.94-60255 (E)

Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of Russia, the United States and Ukraine

Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin and Kravchuk met in Moscow on January 14. The three Presidents reiterated that they will deal with one another as full and equal partners and that relations among their countries must be conducted on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each nation.

The three Presidents agreed on the importance of developing mutually beneficial, comprehensive and cooperative economic relations. In this connection, they welcomed the intention of the United States to provide assistance to Ukraine and Russia to support the creation of effective market economies.

The three Presidents reviewed the progress that has been made in reducing nuclear forces. Deactivation of strategic forces is already well underway in the United States, Russia and Ukraine. The Presidents welcomed the ongoing deactivation of RS-18s (SS-19s) and RS-22s (SS-24s) on Ukrainian territory by having their warheads removed.

The Presidents look forward to the entry into force of the START I Treaty, including the Lisbon Protocol and associated documents, and President Kravchuk reiterated his commitment that Ukraine accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state in the shortest possible time. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin noted that entry into force of START I will allow them to seek early ratification of START II. The Presidents discussed, in this regard, steps their countries would take to resolve certain nuclear weapons questions.

The Presidents emphasized the importance of ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons pending their dismantlement.

The Presidents recognize the importance of compensation to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus for the value of the highly-enriched uranium in nuclear warheads located on their territories. Arrangements have been worked out to provide fair and timely compensation to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus as the nuclear warheads on their territory are transferred to Russia for dismantling.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin expressed satisfaction with the completion of the highly-enriched uranium contract, which was signed by appropriate authorities of the United States and Russia. By converting weapons-grade uranium into uranium which can only be used for peaceful purposes, the highly-enriched uranium agreement is a major step forward in fulfilling the countries' mutual non-proliferation objectives.

The three Presidents decided on simultaneous actions on transfer of nuclear warheads from Ukraine and delivery of compensation to Ukraine in the form of fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin informed President Kravchuk that the United States and Russia are prepared to provide security assurances to Ukraine. In particular, once the START I Treaty enters into force and Ukraine becomes a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States and Russia will:

-- Reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of the CSCE member states and recognize that border changes can be made only by peaceful and consensual means; and reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and that none of their weapons will ever be used except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

-- Reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another CSCE participating state of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind;

-- Reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate UN Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

-- Reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin informed President Kravchuk that consultations have been held with the United Kingdom, the third depositary state of the NPT, and the United Kingdom is prepared to offer the same security assurances to Ukraine once it becomes a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.

President Clinton reaffirmed the United States commitment to provide technical and financial assistance for the safe and secure dismantling of nuclear forces and storage of fissile materials. The United States has agreed under the Nunn-Lugar program to provide Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus with nearly USD 800 million in such assistance, including a minimum of USD 175 million to Ukraine. The United States Congress has authorized additional Nunn-Lugar funds for this program, and the United States will work intensively with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to expand assistance for this important purpose. The United States will also work to promote rapid implementation of the assistance agreements that are already in place.

For the Russian Federation:

For the United States of America:

For Ukraine:

Moscow January 14, 1994

Annex to the January 14 Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of Russia, the United States and Ukraine

The three Presidents decided that, to begin the process of compensation for Ukraine, Russia will provide to Ukraine within ten months fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations containing 100 tons of low-enriched uranium. By the same date, at least 200 nuclear warheads from RS-18 (SS-19) and RS-22 (SS-24) missiles will be transferred from Ukraine to Russia for dismantling. Ukrainian representatives will monitor the dismantling of these warheads. The United States will provide USD 60 million as an advance payment to Russia, to be deducted from payments due to Russia under the highly-enriched uranium contract. These funds would be available to help cover expenses for the transportation and dismantling of strategic warheads and the production of fuel assemblies.

All nuclear warheads will be transferred from the territory of Ukraine to Russia for the purpose of their subsequent dismantling in the shortest possible time. Russia will provide compensation in the form of supplies of fuel assemblies to Ukraine for the needs of its nuclear power industry within the same time period.

Ukraine will ensure the elimination of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, located on its territory in accordance with the relevant agreements and during the seven-year period as provided by the START I Treaty and within the context of the Verkhovna Rada Statement on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine. All RS-22s (SS-24s) on the territory of Ukraine will be deactivated within ten months by having their warheads removed.

Pursuant to agreements reached between Russia and Ukraine in 1993, Russia will provide for the servicing and ensure the safety of nuclear warheads and Ukraine will cooperate in providing conditions for Russia to carry out these operations.

Russia and the United States will promote the elaboration and adoption by the IAEA of an agreement placing all nuclear activities of Ukraine under IAEA safeguards, which will allow the unimpeded export of fuel assemblies from Russia to Ukraine for Ukraine's nuclear power industry.

For the Russian Federation:

For the United States of America:

For Ukraine:

Moscow

January 14, 1994

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1244
8 February 1994

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION DATED 3 FEBRUARY 1994 OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE "ON THE IMPLEMENTATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE "ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS" SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON 31 JULY 1991 AND THE PROTOCOL TO IT SIGNED IN LISBON ON BEHALF OF UKRAINE ON 23 MAY 1992"

I have the honour to forward to you the text of the Resolution dated 3 February 1994, of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On the implementation by the President of Ukraine and the Government of Ukraine of the recommendations contained in paragraph 11 of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On the Ratification of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms" signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991, and the Protocol to it signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on 23 May 1992".

I would be grateful if you could take appropriate steps to register this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and to have it distributed to all member State delegations and to non-member State delegations taking part in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) Olexander Slipchenko
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Ukraine

THE RESOLUTION OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE

On the implementation by the President of Ukraine and the Government of Ukraine of the recommendations contained in the para 11 of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On the Ratification of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms" signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991, and Protocol to it signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on May 23, 1992.

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine:

- taking into account the concrete measures taken by the President and the Government of Ukraine during November 1993 - January 1994 concerning implementation of provisions of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of November 18, 1993;

- proceeding from the results of the meeting of the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and the Russian Federation in Moscow on January 14, 1994, as well as of the Trilateral Statement and the Annex thereto signed by them;

- taking into account the fact, that Ukraine has received the assurances on the side of the Presidents of USA and Russia about their readiness to provide Ukraine with the guarantees of the national security after entry into force of the START-1 Treaty and accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state, as well as bearing in mind the obligations on the side of the United States and Great Britain toward Ukraine to respect independence, sovereignty and existing boundaries, to refrain from the threat by force or its use against territorial integrity or political

independence, to refrain from economic pressure and the commitment not to use any weapons against Ukraine;

- taking into consideration the confirmation by the Presidents of Ukraine, USA and Russia that their relations will be built on the basis of respect of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state, as well as the confirmation of their readiness to provide assistance in the establishment of the effective market economy in Ukraine;

- recognising the fact that the United States of America assured Ukraine in providing technical and financial assistance for the safe and secure dismantlement of the nuclear weapons and storing of fissionable material, as well as contributing to the fast realisation of the already existing agreements in connection with such an assistance;

- taking into account, that in accordance with the Protocol "On the Procedure of the Control over the Elimination of Nuclear Munitions Transferred from the Territory of Ukraine to the Industrial Enterprises of the Russian Federation" the representatives of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine will realise control over the dismantlement and elimination of the strategic nuclear charges on the territory of Russia, that will exclude the re-use of the components of these charges for their original purpose;

- taking also into account the obligation of Russia to provide for the servicing and safety of nuclear charges;

- proceeding from the fact that Ukraine will get the fair compensation for the cost of highly-enriched uranium and other components of all the nuclear weapons, the owner of which Ukraine is;

- taking into consideration the arrangement on providing Ukraine with fair and timely compensation for the cost of highly-enriched uranium on the Russian Federation and the United States

of America while nuclear warheads are being withdrawn from Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement and that measures on withdrawal and providing compensation to Ukraine are simultaneous;

- proceeding from the fact that the United States of America, the Russian Federation and Ukraine will steadily comply with the arrangements contained in the Trilateral Statement and the Annex thereto, and with the existing agreements among them and with those which will be concluded concerning the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine;

- considering that the above mentioned facilitates the implementation of the conditions and reservations which were made in the Resolution of November 18, 1993.

RESOLVES:

1. Bearing in mind the concrete measures taken by the President and the Government of Ukraine on the implementation of the provisions of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of November 18, 1993, the meeting steps on behalf of the USA and Russia, to remove the restriction in respect of the Article V of the Protocol to the START-1 Treaty signed in Lisbon on May 23, 1993.

2. To instruct the Government of Ukraine to realise the exchange of the instruments of ratification on the START-1 Treaty and to intensify the activities on concluding specific international agreements resulting from the reservations contained in the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Ratification of the START-1 Treaty.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1244/Corr.1
2 March 1994

ARABIC and ENGLISH ONLY

LETTER DATED 7 FEBRUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION DATED 3 FEBRUARY 1994 OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE "ON THE IMPLEMENTATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE 'ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS' SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON 31 JULY 1991 AND THE PROTOCOL TO IT SIGNED IN LISBON ON BEHALF OF UKRAINE ON 23 MAY 1992"

Corrigendum

The title of document CD/1244 should read as above.

Page 1, paragraph 1, line 7 and page 2, line 6 of sub-title

For elimination read limitation

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1245
21 February 1994

Original: ENGLISH

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE THIRTY-SEVENTH SESSION OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS

1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, initially established in pursuance of the decision taken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976, held its thirty-seventh formal session from 7 to 18 February 1994, in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. This was the twenty-ninth session of the Group, convened under its new mandate by the decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its 48th meeting on 7 August 1979.

2. The Ad Hoc Group is open to all member States of the Conference on Disarmament. It is also open on a standing basis to all non-member States which have been invited upon their request by the Conference on Disarmament to participate in its work. Accordingly, scientific experts and representatives of the following member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

3. Scientific experts and representatives from the following non-member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Spain and Switzerland.

4. During the session 41 papers containing information on national investigations related to the work of the Group were presented by experts from: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America.

5. The Ad Hoc Group discussed the schedule and plans for developing, testing and evaluating an experimental International Seismic Monitoring System. This effort, referred to as GSETT-3, is now well under way, and builds upon key elements developed in previous tests. The GSETT-3 exercise has three primary objectives that distinguish it from previous tests. These objectives are to:

(a) develop and test new concepts for an experimental International Seismic Monitoring System, building upon previous experience;

(b) provide a practical basis upon which to furnish the Conference on Disarmament with timely technical information;

(c) develop an experimental system that can evolve and adapt to support future requirements that may be set forth by the Conference on Disarmament.

The current plans call for the full-scale phase of GSETT-3 to begin by 1 January 1995. The Group has adopted a schedule to meet this date as follows (note that the various versions of the experimental International Data Center are explained in Annex III):

February 1994:	IDC Version 1 implemented
February-July 1994:	Continue step-by-step implementation of stations, communications network and national facilities
	Operate IDC Version 1
July 1994:	IDC Version 2a implemented
July-October 1994:	Continue step-by-step implementation of stations, communications network and national facilities
	Operate IDC Version 2a
October 1994:	IDC Version 2b implemented
October-December 1994:	Finalize participation of countries and stations
	Finalize elements of the experimental system
	Operate IDC Version 2b
1 January 1995:	IDC Version 3 implemented
	Begin full-scale tests
	Begin evaluation of performance

It is difficult to assess, at this time, the ultimate duration of commitments of the type needed for GSETT-3. For financial planning purposes, countries participating in GSETT-3 should be prepared to support their national facilities and their communication links for a minimum of one year after the start of the full-scale experiment.

6. The Ad Hoc Group expressed grave concern over the lack of commitments of participation of seismological facilities and stations to meet the objectives of GSETT-3. A good global distribution of seismographic stations and communications from these stations to the International Data Center are essential to the success of the GSETT-3. A summary of the countries from which commitments are needed for GSETT-3 are given in Annex I.

- The Ad Hoc Group appreciates the offer of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to assist in widening the participation of countries in the planned GSETT-3. Countries can participate in GSETT-3 by contributing seismic facilities in their countries, by establishing communication links from these facilities to the International Data Center, by participation of National Data Centers and by contributing to the evaluation process. In some cases, bilateral and multilateral cooperation will be important. Countries can also assist by providing technical and financial assistance in these areas to other countries whose participation is essential.

- The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group has written to a number of countries urging their participation in the GSETT-3. Copies of these letters have been provided to the Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. The Ad Hoc Group will continue this initiative.

- Thus far the main focus of the preparations for GSETT-3 has been on identifying and establishing the first tier of the global network, the Alpha stations. The Ad Hoc Group will work to identify additional existing seismic facilities which can contribute to GSETT-3 in those countries which have not yet made a commitment of participation in GSETT-3. To this end the Group designated a representative to work with the Federation of Digital Seismograph Networks (FDSN) to determine the potential usefulness of stations in these networks to GSETT-3. The FDSN has agreed to cooperate with the Ad Hoc Group in this endeavour. Countries having any stations identified through these initiatives will be contacted to obtain formal approval by the country for participation in GSETT-3.

It is of particular importance to ensure financial resources for continuous data transmission, and for operation of other facilities during GSETT-3.

7. The Ad Hoc Group conducted in-depth discussions of the results of the three working groups that it has established to deal with the planning, operation and evaluation of GSETT-3. Several meetings of these working groups were held during the session. A summary of the status of the efforts of these three working groups is annexed to this progress report.

As a result of the efforts of the working groups, substantial progress has been made regarding the preparations for GSETT-3. Particularly noteworthy is the rapid progress in establishing and starting operations at the IDC. Plans for conducting and evaluating GSETT-3 have been developed in considerable detail. There are, however, some areas of concern, as noted by these working groups:

- The current lack of commitment to participate in GSETT-3 may delay a successful optimization of all processes in the GSETT-3 system. The desired gradual build-up towards the full-scale testing may suffer from such delays.

- The successful operation of the IDC during GSETT-3 depends on support from participating countries for both software and personnel. A plan for involvement of a number of countries in the operation of the IDC was presented.

- Significant contributions from experts and NDCs in the participating countries are needed for the evaluation process.

8. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group reported to the Group on the results of informal consultations which he has been conducting with participating delegations on various proposals that were submitted to the Group during its thirty-sixth session. These proposals, on which no consensus was reached at that time concerned work in the areas of seismic event identification methods, non-seismological monitoring techniques, and for the consideration of non-seismic methods.

9. The Ad Hoc Group is at present giving priority to the planning and conduct of GSETT-3. This extensive global experiment could provide information relating to a future International Seismic Monitoring System (ISMS) which could be useful to the NTB Committee in their negotiations:

- The station network designed for GSETT-3 could provide a basis for the design of the ISMS.

- The functions and products which have been designed for the experimental IDC could be a guide to the functions and products required from the ISMS for monitoring purposes.

- The detailed instructions and procedures developed for GSETT-3 could provide a good foundation for an Operating Manual for the components of the ISMS.

- The hardware and software developed at the experimental IDC and at existing and new seismological stations, and the experience gained by system operators around the world, could provide a valuable infrastructure that could facilitate the rapid implementation of the ISMS.

- The results and experiences which could be obtained as GSETT-3 evolves could be useful in modifying the system design, in estimating system capabilities, staffing requirements and operating instructions of the ISMS.

- GSETT-3 could provide valuable information on costs associated with the establishment and operation of the ISMS.

10. As previously noted, the infrastructure of the ISMS is flexible enough to incorporate the collection, archiving and distribution of data from non-seismic techniques, for example, radioactivity, hydroacoustics and infrasound. During the session, the Group received two national reports on networks for monitoring radionuclides in the atmosphere.

11. More specifically, the Ad Hoc Group proposes to undertake the following tasks in support of the CD and its NTB Committee:

- Conduct GSETT-3 as planned.

- Provide information on all aspects of GSETT-3 to the CD, the NTB Committee and any of its working groups.

- Study how the GSETT-3 data exchange system, in particular the experimental IDC, might also be used for the collection, processing and distribution of data from other monitoring techniques.

- Respond in a timely and prompt manner to requests from the NTB Committee or its Verification Working Group for specific tasks of a technical and scientific nature.

12. The Ad Hoc Group received and appreciated briefings from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The Group agreed to invite the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee's Working Group on Verification to its next sessions.

13. The Ad Hoc Group noted with appreciation the convening of three informal technical meetings since its previous session.

- During 9-11 August 1993, Finland hosted an informal workshop in Helsinki on the issue of seismic detection methods. The workshop was organized into two parts, comprising invited technical presentations and drafting of a report. The workshop was attended by eight experts from five countries.

- On 2 November 1993, the United States hosted a tour and informal demonstration for CD ambassadors of the facilities of the experimental International Data Center (IDC) being developed by the Group for the GSETT-3. The purpose was to acquaint the participants with the ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Group as related to the planning and carrying out of the GSETT-3, with particular emphasis on the role of the International Data Center. Representatives from 25 countries attended the

demonstration and tour. The Chairman and Scientific Secretary of the GSE also attended and provided an overview of the activities and plans of the Group to the ambassadors.

- During 10-14 November 1993, Italy hosted a workshop in Erice, Sicily, on planning and procedures for GSETT-3. The aim of the workshop was to provide a factual contribution to the activities of the Ad Hoc Group before its thirty-seventh formal session. In particular, the workshop was dedicated to the preparation of the GSETT-3 global experiment. The workshop was attended by 50 experts from 23 countries. Proceedings from the workshop will be published as a special issue of the scientific journal "Annali di Geofisica".

14. The Ad Hoc Group received a request from the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to provide a report summarizing the activities of the Group in the context of the GSETT-3. The Ad Hoc Group appointed a drafting group to prepare such a report. The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 21 to 25 March 1994 in Geneva, to finalize the report and present the report to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Thereafter, the Ad Hoc Group envisages to meet early in the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, at a date to be agreed during the March session.

Annex I

GSETT-3 Participation Status as of 18 February 1994

Country	Prop. Alpha Stations	No. of Stations by countries * Alpha	Beta	Date, when decision on commitment is expected	Date, when data will be available to the IDC	Comments
Argentina	1	-	-	-	-	-
Australia	5	5	11	committed	Mar.-Sep. 1994	-
Austria	0	0	1	June 1994	Aug. 1994	-
Belgium	0	0	0	-	-	Gamma only
Bolivia	1	-	-	-	-	-
Botswana	1	-	-	-	-	-
Brazil	1	1	0	committed	-	-
Canada	3	6	19	unknown	Mar./June 1994	-
Centr. Afric. Rep.	1	-	-	-	-	-
China	3	-	-	-	-	to be defined
Czech Rep.	0	0	1	unknown	Sep. 1994	-
Denmark	1	1	0	July 1994	July 1994	Planning remains
Egypt	1	1	0	unknown	unknown	Work remains
Finland	1	1	4	committed	now	-
France	0	-	-	-	-	under examination
Germany	1	1	9	unknown	now	-
Hungary	0	0	1	committed	now	-
India	1	1	0	committed	-	-
Indonesia	1	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	0	0	2	committed	now	-
Ivory Coast	1	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	1	1	0	committed	June 1994	-
Kazakhstan	1	-	-	-	-	-
Kenya	1	-	-	-	-	-
Rep. of Korea	1	-	-	-	-	-
Mexico	0	1	2	June 1994	July 1994	Work remains
Netherlands	0	0	1	committed	Aug. 1994	-
N. Africa (XAF)	1	-	-	-	-	MEDNET Opt.
New Zealand	0	0	2	committed	now	-
Norway	3	3	1	committed	now/Oct. 1994	-
Pakistan	1	1	1	committed	unknown	Comm. uncertain
Paraguay	1	-	-	-	-	-
Papua New Guinea	1	-	-	-	-	-
Peru	0	-	-	-	-	-
Romania	0	0	1	committed	Sep. 1994	-
Russian Fed.	5	4	6	May 1994	Jan. 1995	-
S. America (XSA)	1	-	-	-	-	-
South Africa	1	1	1	committed	Mar./June 1994	Work remains
Spain	1	1	0	committed	Jan. 1995	poss. plus 1 Beta
Sweden	0	1	0	committed	May 1994	Coop. with Norway
Switzerland	0	0	3	April 1994	Jan. 1995	Work remains
Thailand	1	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	1	-	-	-	-	-
Turkmenistan	1	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	0	0	1	committed	Oct. 1994	-
United States	8	11	14	comm.:3α,9β	now/Apr.1994/unkn.	Work remains
Total (committed)	53	41 (19)	81 (35)			

* No. of stations already committed, or planned (not yet committed)

Countries for which a commitment is needed for one or more Alpha stations in the GSETT-3 network:

Argentina
Bolivia
Botswana
Canada
Central African Republic
China
Denmark
Egypt
Germany
Indonesia
Ivory Coast
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Republic of Korea
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Russian Federation
Thailand
Turkey
Turkmenistan

Annex II

STATUS REPORT FROM GSETT-3 WORKING GROUP ON PLANNING

Terms of reference

The main purpose of the Working Group on Planning is to organize the preparations for GSETT-3. Work is being conducted under the following terms of reference:

1. Design and develop the plan and procedures for GSETT-3, including the structure of the overall documentation for the test. The documentation structure would include all the information needed to plan, operate and evaluate GSETT-3.

2. Coordinate the plan and procedures documentation with the Operations and Evaluation Working Groups to ensure that it reflects all the information needed by all the groups.

3. Initiate informal technical contact with potential participants to help define the Alpha, Beta and Gamma stations. Advise the Scientific Secretary and the Chairman of need to initiate formal contacts.

4. On behalf of the Planning, Operations and Evaluation Working Groups, serve as a focal point to contact participants and collect all information needed for the plan and procedures documentation.

5. Produce the documentation and distribute it to the Group through the Scientific Secretary.

6. Continue to develop and maintain the GSETT-3 documentation throughout the planning, operations and evaluation phases of GSETT-3.

Overall documentation structure

The GSETT-3 Working Groups have agreed to produce an integrated set of documentation for the test, containing all the material needed to plan, conduct and evaluate GSETT-3. An overall structure comprising five volumes is envisaged, as follows:

Volume 0: Overview
Volume 1: Plan
Volume 2: Operations materials
Volume 3: Facilities
Volume 4: Evaluation

An overview of GSETT-3 (Volume 0) has already been produced in the form of a colour booklet. The task of preparing material for the other four volumes has been

distributed between the working groups. Volume 3 will contain factual information on all facilities used in GSETT-3, including stations, data centres (NDCs and IDC) and communications. The GSETT-3 participants will be responsible for providing the information required on the facilities contributed. To facilitate the process of collecting and compiling such data, one or more templates are being developed and will be forwarded to the GSETT-3 participants in due course.

Participation

In its session in August 1993, the GSE proposed an Alpha network comprising 53 stations. Countries for which commitment to participate with proposed Alpha stations was lacking, were approached in writing in December 1993. A few of these countries have since made their commitment, but it is very disturbing that only 19 Alpha stations are committed as of the end of the February 1994 GSE session. Further calls for participation have been initiated through the CD and its NTB Ad Hoc Committee.

Several questionnaires have been issued to collect information needed from GSETT-3 participants, especially on status development and contact persons. One questionnaire issued together with the Operations Working Group collected information on plans related to reporting by the NDCs of Gamma data. It appears that many countries plan to provide such data, but it may be difficult for them to find resources to provide Gamma data within 48 hours, especially during weekends.

Definition of the Beta-station network

A specific network of Beta stations for GSETT-3 has not yet been defined. Several countries have offered such stations, and efforts are under way to identify additional candidate stations around the world that would meet the requirements. Stations that belong to networks associated with the International Federation of Broadband Digital Seismograph Networks are of special interest in this regard. A concrete proposal for a Beta-station network will be worked out, so that the host countries in question can be approached and asked to make commitments to contribute data from these stations in GSETT-3.

Areas of concern

The major concern is the current lack of commitment to participate with Alpha stations in GSETT-3. This can potentially hamper the development work at the IDC, and makes the desired gradual build-up towards the full-scale testing more difficult.

Another concern at this time is a potential lack of geographical balance in the Beta-station network.

Annex III

STATUS REPORT FROM GSETT-3 WORKING GROUP ON OPERATIONS

Terms of reference

The terms of reference of the Operations Working Group have been agreed as follows:

1. Design and implement the elements of the Experimental International Seismic Monitoring System according to the concepts agreed to within the GSE.

2. Establish the system requirements, the functional specifications and operational plans.

3. Provide information to the planning group for them to incorporate this information into the GSETT-3 Plan and Procedures documentation.

4. Provide metrics to the Evaluation Group on a timely basis in agreed formats.

5. Incorporate recommendations from the Evaluation Group on an ongoing basis during GSETT-3. For example, expanding the network, upgrading the stations, incorporation of new procedures.

6. Maintain technical contacts during GSETT-3.

GSETT-3 operations plan

The plan calls for a serious of four versions of the system (0, 1, 2 and 3) leading up to the start of full-scale testing of the complete system at the beginning of 1995. Each version will include new participants, stations, software, hardware, staff and processing objectives. During version 0, which began in early 1993, the Operations Group focused on adding new stations, testing communications facilities and the development of IDC software.

Design of the general IDC systems architecture is nearly complete. The data processing and analysis programs are improved versions of those used by the Washington IDC during GSETT-2. New software for acquiring and providing access to data has been developed and is currently being tested in cooperation with several National Data Centers (NDCs). The flexibility of the architecture will permit relatively easy modification of most operational procedures, for example, signal and event processing parameters, time schedules etc.

GSETT-3 version 0 results

Processing of data collected from six Alpha and fifteen Beta stations in Europe and Scandinavia resulted in the production of an Alpha Event List within about one hour, and an analyst Reviewed Event Bulletin within two days that contain a daily average of about 20 events. The addition of data from Beta stations in central Europe (the only area where the density of version 0 Beta stations is significantly higher than for the Alpha stations) resulted in an 84 per cent decrease in the area of the location error ellipse.

GSETT-3 version 1 started in February 1994. The major objective during version 1 will be to add further stations and to add and test new seismological procedures discussed by the GSE.

Operations manuals

The Operations Working Group has assumed responsibility for preparing volume 2 of the GSETT-3 documentation. This volume, to be divided into three manuals, will describe facilities, supporting organizations and operational procedures for the three key elements of the system, namely:

International Data Center
National Data Centers
Seismic Stations

An outline of the volume has been agreed upon which provides a comprehensive and consistent structure between the various manuals. Particular emphasis has been placed on defining the operational aspects of the new concepts that most widely affect the participants and products including communications of both Alpha and Beta data, selection and use of Gamma data, signal and event processing and services to be provided to the participants. Much of the material required for these documents is already available and it is expected that complete drafts of all three manuals will be completed during the intersessional period.

Areas of concern

- The successful optimization of all processes in the GSETT-3 system depends crucially on the early implementation and testing of new stations prior to the start of the full-scale test in 1995. At this time only about 10 per cent of the proposed number of stations are contributing data to the GSETT-3 system.

- The Operations Group is actively seeking support from participating States for software and staff to ensure successful operation of the IDC during GSETT-3.

Annex IV

STATUS REPORT FROM GSETT-3 WORKING GROUP ON EVALUATION

Terms of reference

The terms of reference of the Evaluation Working Group have been identified as follows:

1. Develop criteria for, and execute, acceptance tests for all elements of the system.

2. Develop criteria for and execute dynamic ongoing evaluations on the operation and performance of the system.

3. Develop criteria for and execute periodic comprehensive evaluations on the operation and performance of the system.

4. In executing these tests and evaluations, engage all participants to the extent required.

5. Provide recommendations to the Operations Working Group on an ongoing basis during GSETT-3.

6. Collect all the data and information needed to evaluate all elements of the EISMS, including cost.

7. Provide appropriate documentation for all the above steps and formal reports to the GSE.

Time Schedule of the Evaluation Task

The evaluation task is an ongoing process with the following tentative schedule:

following 1994:	Presentation of the proposed evaluation programme to the GSE
March 1994:	Start evaluation of available elements of the EISMS
July 1994:	first evaluation report on the IDC and some other modules of the EISMS
September 1994:	acceptance testing of the components of the EISMS. i.e. some of the alpha stations, the beta stations, the IDC, the communications and the NDC

February 1995: evaluation report on the performance of the EISMS at least every six months to the GSE; with possible modifications of evaluation criteria, and of concepts and procedures of the EISMS

Organization

Detailed test methods will be worked out by the evaluation group in conjunction with the Operations Working group. These should describe exactly what will be tested, who is responsible and what the criteria of success are.

The evaluation will require contributions from many experts but it is the responsibility of the evaluation group to propose the evaluation criteria, to coordinate the evaluation, to evaluate the overall performance of the EISMS and to report to the GSE.

These reports will be written every sixth month and should contain an evaluation of the EISMS with regard to the objectives set by the GSE. Areas where improvements are needed will be identified and if these improvements require changes in the concepts or in agreed procedures, the evaluation group will propose such changes to the GSE. If only changes in the implementation details are needed, they will be addressed directly to the operations working group.

Evaluation manual

The Evaluation Working Group is responsible for preparing volume 4 of the GSETT-3 documentation. After an overview of the evaluation programme, and of the general issues to be fulfilled by the EISMS (such as new concepts, detection capability, location accuracy, cost estimates, etc.). This volume will contain a comprehensive description of each module of EISMS (stations, communications, NDC, IDC and seismological methods) in terms of standards required, acceptance tests, ongoing evaluation and responsibility for their evaluation.

It is expected that a complete draft of this volume will be submitted to the GSE during the present session.

Areas of concern

To achieve such a goal, the Evaluation Working Group needs the efficient participation of experts and NDC facilities during the entire evaluation process.